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THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT*
Siegfried Wiessner**
I. INTRODUCTION
In his theory of the republic, Plato conceived of the
leader of a community as a wise philosopher-king, dedicating
himself to the pursuit of the good of the community and the
common interest.1 The American Revolution2 set itself against
* Lecture given by Professor Wiessner at Lincoln Memorial
University Duncan School of Law’s symposium “Navigating the
Political Divide: Lesson from Lincoln,” held April 20, 2012 in
Knoxville, TN. The author is grateful for comments offered by
Professors Michael Reisman and Keith Nunes as well as
transcription and careful editing by his research assistant Alexandra
Salvador and by Jeff Glaspie and his team at the LMU Law Review.
Above all, he thanks Professor Sandra Ruffin, a long-time friend and
former colleague at St. Thomas Law, for the honor of inviting him to
this symposium.
One of a kind, Professor Ruffin was a
distinguished scholar and teacher who reminded everyone of the
task of law to build an order of human dignity which leaves nobody
behind. This essay is dedicated to her memory.
** Professor of Law and Director, Graduate Program in Intercultural
Human Rights, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami,
Florida.
1 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. V, at 153 (Allan Bloom trans., 2nd ed.
1991).
2
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1789 (1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
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this idea of one benign, all-powerful monarch on the
assumption that human beings cannot be seen as completely
altruistic, committed to the well-being and the flourishing of
others. In particular, they saw clearly that men—and I assume
women as well—are no angels3 and therefore governmental
powers had to be, by necessity, divided so that the excessive
ambition of one could be held in check by the ambition of
others.4 Thus the construct of separating powers, both
vertically5 and horizontally,6 and the particularly American
principle of having nobody serve in two branches at the same
time, i.e. the personal separation of powers—an idea
unfamiliar to other modern democracies such as the United

RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992). The ideals of its
democratic revolution have become a model for the world. GORDON
S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY (2002); R.R.
PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION. VOL. I: THE
CHALLENGE (1959).
3 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (February 6, 1788), with
its iconic language: “If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary.” See also GOTTFRIED
DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC OF FEDERALISM AND FREE
GOVERNMENT (1960); DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE
FEDERALIST (1984); THE ENDURING FEDERALIST (Charles A. Beard ed.,
1948).
4 Madison, supra note 3, “Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition.”
5 Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: An Architecture for Freedom, 1 NEW
EUROPE L. REV. 129 (1992-1993); A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of
Federalism, 1 NEW EUROPE L. REV. 143 (1992-1993); Victoria Nourse,
The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 777 (1999). Roots of
the idea can be found in JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (1603)
(Frederick S. Carney ed. & trans., 2013).
6 Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu,
in his 1748 book DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS (translated 1750 into English as
The Spirit of the Laws), urged that the political authority of the state be
divided into separate and independent legislative, executive and
judicial powers.
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Kingdom where the Chief Executive, the Prime Minister, is
also a member of Parliament.7
On the other hand, the Constitution appears to
recognize the need for a strong community response to threats
—thus the grant of apparently undivided executive power,
novel from the Articles of Confederation.8 While Congress’
power was enumerated in Article I, with whatever minor
adjustments McCulloch and the necessary and proper clause
wrought to it,9 the President was vested with “executive
power” as declared in Article II.10 It is argued that therefore
all executive action in the burgeoning welter of the modern
administrative state derived ultimately from the President.
The President also was accorded the original power of
Commander-in-Chief,11 and the power to appoint members of
his or her branch and also the judiciary.12 In order to acquit
The requirement, by constitutional convention, that the Prime
Minister be elected by Parliament, reduces the danger of gridlock
more likely to be experienced in a presidential system, where both
the head of the executive branch and all the members of the
legislative branch enjoy direct democratic legitimacy conferred by
the people.
8 The Articles of Confederation of 1781 constituted a “firm league of
friendship” amongst the thirteen seceding former British colonies
(Article III). Their institutional focus was on the legislature of the
“united states, in Congress assembled” (e.g., Article IX), with the
standing committee of this institution representing the closest
analogue to an executive in the sense of a permanently sitting organ.
9 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1: “The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America.”
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1: “The President shall be Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States. …”
12 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2: “He … shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the

7
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themselves of what they saw as their responsibility to the
nation, Presidents since Lincoln and Roosevelt have asserted
the power to control their branch by issuing commands from
the White House directing departments and administrative
agencies to pursue certain policies. This original content of the
theory of the “unitary executive,”13 advocated mainly at the
end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, was
arguably expanded to include broad powers in the field of
national security14 resting more on an emergency rationale,
rather than the idea of the President’s accountability for all the
acts of his or her branch.
Opponents of this idea of strong executive power,
unbridled within the branch and far-reaching outside, were
pointing to the Constitution’s grant of power to Congress to
make all laws necessary to execute their legislative powers,
including measures directed towards “departments.” The
Congress created departments and agencies with discretion,
isolated from direct orders by the President or other members
of the Executive Branch. The motives were often respect for
the subject-matter expertise of agency decision makers, who
were in need of protection against overly political or partisan
incursions (such as the Federal Reserve15), or required
safeguards for their independence and impartiality to ensure
the quality and fairness of quasi-judicial determinations (such

President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”
13 For a history of the idea from the beginnings of the Republic, see
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE. PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).
For a highly critical assessment, see JOHN P. MACKENZIE, ABSOLUTE
POWER: HOW THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY IS UNDERMINING THE
CONSTITUTION (2008).
14 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 18-19: “Most recently, the
administration of George W. Bush has explicitly invoked the theory
of the unitary executive as the basis for asserting sweeping implied
emergency powers in waging the War on Terrorism.”
15 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 341 (1913).
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as asylum decisions rendered by an immigration judge16). As
we will see, the Supreme Court respected these limits by
allowing Congress to limit the President’s originally
unrestrained removal power to cause, at least in cases of
certain officials exercising quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
power.
To properly delimit the scope of Presidential power, it
would help to start with the structure, the architecture of the
Constitution. The Executive Power is not the first one
mentioned in this foundational document; in the sequence of
the Constitution, it is listed after the powers of Congress,
enumerated in Article I. That should tell us something. It
reflects the judgment of the fathers of the Constitution that
Congress is, or should be, pre-eminent in setting policy for the
nation. The President has to “take care” that he or she
implement the policy set by Congress; he or she has to
faithfully execute it -- nota bene “faithfully.”17 He or she is not
allowed to depart from the text and policy of a congressional
statute; that is the original idea. For these reasons, I usually
start my Constitutional Law class in Miami with McCulloch v.
Maryland,18 not, as most other teachers and casebooks do, with
Marbury v. Madison19—the former dealing with the range of
“Immigration Judges are responsible for conducting Immigration
Court proceedings and act independently in deciding matters before
them. Immigration Judges are tasked with resolving cases in a
manner that is timely, impartial, and consistent with the
Immigration and Nationality Act, federal regulations, and precedent
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal appellate
courts.” IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, last revised June
10, 2013, ch. 1.2(a), at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (last visited November 24, 2013).
17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3: “[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed. ...” Even his oath of office includes this
commitment: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States.” (U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 8, emphasis added).
18 See supra note 9.
19 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

16
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express and implied powers of Congress, the latter with the
authority of the Supreme Court.
Now, Congress often does not live up to the exalted
role that the founding fathers foresaw for it. Part of the reason
for it is that the Senate straight-jacketed itself with the
requirement, not constitutionally mandated, of a supermajority of sixty (60) votes to close debate and proceed to a
vote on the merits of a bill, if a so-called filibuster is signaled.
At a time of a nearly ubiquitous use of that instrument,20 a
simple majority of fifty-one (51) is often no longer sufficient to
have pieces of legislation approved by the Senate. The House
of Representatives, on the other hand, still makes decisions by
simple majority vote, so that institution should not have as
much of a problem in reaching decisions and molding
legislation. Since, however, every enactment has to be to the
comma the same in both houses, federal legislation is hard to
achieve, especially when government is divided by political
party and ideology. In addition, the various branches of
government are not hermetically sealed from each other. There
20

See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington,
Reforming
a
Broken
Senate:
Filibuster
Reform,
http://www.citizensforethics.org/policy/entry/filibuster-reform
(last visited November 21, 2013): “Some simple statistics highlight
the present predicament. From roughly 1920 to 1970, filibusters
averaged one a year. In stark contrast, in 2005-2006, there were an
average of 34 cloture motions filed to end filibusters, and in the 200708 Congress there were 139 cloture motions filed, roughly 70 a year.
So far in the session (2009-2010), 132 cloture motions have been
filed.”
See
also
http://senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/
cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm (last visited November 21, 2013)
for a year-by-year statistical chart tracking Senate cloture motions
from 1917 to present; See also Janet Hook & Kristina Peterson,
Democrats Reign In Senate Filibusters, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21,
2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023046
0710579211881413579404 on a November 21, 2013 Senate rule change
which effectively ends the use of filibusters for executive branch
appointments and most judicial branch appointments. This so-called
“nuclear option” will not affect filibusters of legislation or Supreme
Court nominations.
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are checks and balances between them. In the area of
legislation, the President has a veto power. Once a law has
been passed, though, he or she owes the duty to faithfully
execute Congress’ will. On the other hand, he or she has the
original power of the Commander-in-Chief,21 the power to
make treaties,22 and the power to appoint, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and also to remove, officers of the
United States.23
The Federalist Papers do not talk much about the
general nature of how this executive power should be
interpreted. Alexander Hamilton, however, made the
comment that “energy in the Executive is the leading
characteristic in the definition of good government.”24 One
would hope that any person who exercises governmental
power be energetic, particularly one holding an office within
the Executive Branch. Theodore Roosevelt has staked out the
position of broad executive power in his theory of the
stewardship of the country by the President. He stated:
[T]he executive power is limited only by
specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing
in the Constitution, or imposed by the Congress
under its Constitutional powers. My view was
that every executive officer, and above all every
officer in high position, was a steward of the
people bound actively and affirmatively to do
all he could for the people, and not to content
himself with the negative merit of keeping his
talents undamaged in a napkin. I declined to
adopt the view that what was imperatively
necessary for the Nation could not be done by

See supra note 11.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2: “He shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur…”
23 See supra note 12.
24 THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (March 15, 1788).
21

22
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the President unless he could find some specific
authorization to do it. 25

His successor, and his own Secretary of War, William Howard
Taft, is cited for the opposite position:
The President can exercise no power which
cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some
specific grant of power or justly implied and
included within such express grant as proper
and necessary to its exercise. There is, he said,
no undefined residuum of power which he can
exercise because it seems to him to be in the
public interest.26
These are two conflicting positions, and they have led to
controversies over certain exercises of Presidential powers.
Ultimately, they rest on the seemingly eternal conflict between
an interpretation of the Constitution that relies virtually
exclusively on its text and original meaning27 and the other
reading which considers it a “living document.”28

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1913).
WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139140 ( 1916).
27
For early formulations of this position, see Maurice Merrill,
Constitutional Interpretation: The Obligation to Respect the Text, in
PERSPECTIVES OF LAW: ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT 260
(Roscoe Pound et al. eds. 1964); see also Justice Sutherland in Home
Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-49, 453 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justice Black summarizes: “Our written
Constitution means to me that where a power is not in terms granted
or not necessary and proper to exercise a power granted, no such
power exists in any branch of the government -- executive,
legislative or judicial. Thus, it is language and history that are the
crucial factors which influence me in interpreting the Constitution -not reasonableness or desirability as determined by justices of the
Supreme Court.” HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 8 (1968).
For today’s defense of the textualist position, see Justice ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997). See also the video Scalia explains textualism, available at
25

26
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II. THE DUTY TO FAITHFULLY EXECUTE THE LAWS
Let us address first the duty to faithfully execute the
laws. Under this rule, the President may not simply refuse to
execute the law or a decision of a court interpreting it. May I
offer one example. In Worcester v. Georgia,29 the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice John Marshall upheld the validity of
a treaty between the United States and the Cherokee Nation,
which gave the latter rights to self-government over their
lands in the State of Georgia. Andrew Jackson, President at
the time, supposedly said, “John Marshall has made his ruling,
now let him enforce it.”30 Actually, Jackson had the military
force to back him up, and, indeed, he failed to take any action
to enforce the Supreme Court’s decision in this case. What
happened instead, in his Presidency, was the forced exodus of

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FEKVXK61mew (last visited
November 24, 2013).
28 The idea is generally attributed to Chief Justice John Marshall’s
statement in McCulloch v. Maryland: "We must never forget that it is
a constitution we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs." See supra note 9, at 407. Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes amplified that the “power of ‘judicial review’ has given the
Court a crucial responsibility in assuring individual rights, as well as
in maintaining a ‘living Constitution’ whose broad provisions are
continually applied to complicated new situations.” Supreme Court
of the United States, The Court and Constitutional Interpretation,
Charles
Evans
Hughes
Cornerstone
Address,
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx
(last
visited November 24, 2013). See also Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution
as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); and William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976).
29 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
30 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 450, referencing JEAN EDWARD
SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 516-18 (1996), who
noted that Jackson “probably did not make that statement, at least
not in that form,” and that he “had no duty to enforce that particular
judgment at that point.”
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Native Americans to Oklahoma, the tragic Trail of Tears31 – an
area declared to be Indian territory forever, only to be turned
over half a century later to new inhabitants of the later State of
Oklahoma in the Land Run of 1889.32 President Obama went
in a different policy direction when he, on December 16, 2010,
declared the United States’ support33 for the 2007 U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,34 including
rights to land and autonomy,35 reversing the Bush
administration’s initial rejection of that declaration. Now there
has not been an executive order or a Presidential directive,
which would be binding and arguably within the President’s
executive power, that would force the administrative agencies,
like the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), to implement the Declaration. But I am
Based on the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the Trail of Tears of the
"Five Civilized Tribes" with its countless deaths, trauma and misery
represented the nadir of the United States policy to remove Indians
from the Eastern seaboard. See GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL:
THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS (1953); see
also ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN (1972).
32 See KENNY A. FRANKS & PAUL F. LAMBERT, OKLAHOMA, THE LAND
AND ITS PEOPLE 17-30 (1994); see also STAN HOIG, THE OKLAHOMA
LAND RUSH OF 1889 (1989).
33
For President Barack Obama’s declaration of support, see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/
remarks-president-white-house-tribal-nations-conference
(last
visited November 24, 2013).
34 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
G.A. Res.61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
DRIPS_en.pdf.
31

35

According to the International Law Association’s Resolution No.
5/2012 of August 30, 2012, the Declaration reflects customary
international law rights of indigenous peoples to their cultural
heritage, autonomy, and traditional lands.
For its text, see
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/ cid/1024; for
background, see Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121140 (2011), available at http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/1/
121.full.pdf+ html (last visited November 24, 2013).
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told that, at least now, Indian leaders feel much more welcome
in the corridors of power. Prior to the President’s endorsement
of the Declaration, Indian representatives may have been
given a few minutes with a low-level employee of the BIA in
Washington; now, I understand, they get one hour,
courteously provided by the head of the agency. Things
change.
President Lincoln provided another example of a
somewhat controversial use of executive power, when he
interpreted the Constitution contrary to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.36 Technically speaking, he
was questioning the rule of law, at least in its formal sense.
Although the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution itself, as
interpreted by the Court, might have violated natural law, or
what we think is right and decent, positivist lawyers could see
his attitude as disrespect for the ruling of the Supreme Court
which had to be obeyed whether one liked it or not. Later, on
the other side of history, Southern governors refused to
comply with Brown v. Board of Education,37 the command to
desegregate. The Supreme Court did not take too kindly to
that act of resistance. Arkansas’ Governor, Orval Faubus, had
referred to his oath of office where he swore to abide by the
Constitution; he maintained he would just interpret the
Constitution differently than the Supreme Court and remain
with the “separate, but equal” doctrine, then overruled, of
Plessey v. Ferguson.38 The Supreme Court did not agree,
reaffirming that it is its exclusive domain to say, with finality,
what the Constitution means.39 Brown was now the supreme
law of the land, to be observed by any other agent of
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that the Arkansas
Governor and Legislature were bound by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution after state officials had failed
to properly implement the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
36
37
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Government.40
Marbury had already held that it is
“emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”41 The Supreme Court also
reaffirmed against Congress its pre-eminence in interpreting
the Constitution when it struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, as applied to the states, in which Congress
attempted to redefine the standard of review for the
application of the Free Exercise Clause.42
Controversy also surrounds a third issue of the
exercise of presidential power, i.e. the increasing practice of
the President to issue statements on the validity or
interpretation of a law at the time of his signing it. Some of
these “signing statements” had already been issued under
President Clinton; they proliferated under President George
W. Bush; and they continued under President Obama, though
to a lesser degree; functionally, they may go back as far as
President Monroe.43 These statements do not only provide for
an interpretation of the law as seen from the President’s perch;
they also include declarations of the law that he just signed as
unconstitutional.44 Some of President Bush’s statements stood
out as they “routinely asserted that he will not act contrary to
the constitutional provisions that direct the president to
Id. at 18.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
42 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
43 See The American Presidency Project, Presidential Signing
Statements,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/signingstatements.
php (last visited November 22, 2013) for general information about
presidential signing statements as well as a detailed database on
signing statements issued by various Presidents.
44 See President Bush’s signing statement regarding H.R. 2068 made
on August 23, 2002 found at http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002book2/html/PPP-2002-book2-doc-pg1471.htm
(last
visited
November 22, 2013); see also Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies from President Obama on
Presidential Signing Statements (March 9, 2009) found at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ Memorandum-onPresidential-Signing-Statements (last visited November 22, 2013).
40

41
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‘supervise the unitary executive branch.’”45 A couple of times
these statements merely reflected political differences because
they go to the reach of the President’s war power or they
introduce new reporting requirements to Congress, and so on.
The President, in this case, just wants to maintain his position
on an issue that has not yet been finally decided by the
Supreme Court. In a second set of statements, President Bush
has been clearly in the right. These include flagging a statute
as unconstitutional when it includes provisions that provide a
“legislative veto” held unconstitutional in Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Chadha46 and its progeny.47 That means
that the executive implementation of a law cannot be made
subject to the review, reconsideration and ultimate rejection by
members of Congress, even individual committee chairs, or
one house of Congress or both houses, and so on. That
statutory reservation of power appears to plainly violate I.N.S.
v. Chadha and established Supreme Court jurisprudence. As to
the President, what would be the alternative to him? Could he
veto that particular provision? This, again, would be
unconstitutional as it would be equivalent to a line-item veto,
declared unconstitutional in Clinton v. The City of New York.48
So, if Congress decides to bundle everything on its legislative
agenda into one statute, an omnibus bill, then the President
has to either veto the entire legislation or let it pass in its
entirety. In this regard, many of the states’ constitutions are
probably much more preferable because they have allowed
line-item vetoes.49 They also often include a single-subject
requirement, disallowing the bundling, in one piece of

Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 43.
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
47 See President Bush’s statement cited supra in note 44.
48 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
49 See Separation of Powers—Executive Veto Powers, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-executiveveto-powers.aspx (last visited November 22, 2013) noting that 44
states allow their executive the power of the line-item veto.
45

46
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legislation, of all kinds of different issues (as in an “omnibus
bill”).50 In the absence of such a constitutional provision on the
federal level, what is the President to do? An ABA BlueRibbon Task Force has stated that signing statements denying
the constitutionality and enforceability of certain provisions of
non-vetoed legislation are highly problematic in light of the
Constitution’s separation of powers and the rule of law.51 The
legislative intent could not be determined out of a mix
between what the Congress intended and the President
intended. The Congress, in Article I, is appointed to be the
principal legislator; the President is encouraged to veto the
law if he or she finds it unconstitutional or unwise. At this
point, no single court has yet used signing statements as
binding interpretations of a law, but the legality of
administrative action based on them is a subject of
controversy.52

III. THE EXPRESS POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO APPOINT AND
REMOVE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES
See Single Subject Rules, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/single-subject-rules.aspx (last visited November 22,
2013) stating “41 states have constitutional provisions stipulating
that bills may address only one subject, and several others have
chamber rules for single-subject bills.”
51 Press Release, American Bar Association, Blue-Ribbon Task Force
Finds Bush’s Signing Statements Undermine Separation of Powers
(July 24, 2006), available at http://archive.is/Z4V4y (last visited
November 24, 2013). See also Walter Dellinger, The Legal Significance
of Presidential Signing Statements, Memorandum to Bernard N.
Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, November 3, 1993, at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/signing.htm (last visited November 24,
2013).
52 Nicholas J. Leddy, Determining Due Deference: Examining When
Courts Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 869 (2007).
50
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Beyond the obligation to faithfully executive the laws,
which translates into a power derived from Congress, the
President has original powers. One of them is the power to
nominate and remove officers of the United States.53 The logic
is that the President has to have the authority to choose the
members of his branch and to entrust the job of faithfully
executing the law to them.54 If the President cannot trust them,
he or she cannot perform his or her constitutional obligation;
thus the argument for an unfettered power of removal under
the theory of a unitary executive branch. At first, Congress
approved allowing the President to remove, at will, the
Secretaries of War, Foreign Affairs, and Treasury as seen fit by
the President. Vice-President John Adams, in a famed decision
of 1789, broke a 10 to 10 tie in the Senate in favor of the
President’s power to fire the Secretary of the Treasury.55
Subsequently, in September 1833, Andrew Jackson fired two
Treasury Secretaries to appoint one who would agree with
him and his command to terminate the Second Bank of the
United States.56 That was a successful use of the claimed
unfettered power. Later, President Nixon, fired attorney
generals Elliot Richardson and William Ruckleshaus in
sequence one Saturday night,57 when they would not remove
special prosecutor Archibald Cox, appointed to investigate the
Watergate affair. This “Saturday Night Massacre” led to a
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
55 JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION: 1789, at 217-18
(1948); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 59, 445.
56 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 105 et seq. See generally
Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and The Federal Deficit: Form,
Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 721-22
(1987).
57 Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson,
Ruckelshaus Quit: President Abolishes Prosecutor’s Office; FBI Seals
Records,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Oct.
21,
1973),
http://washingtonpost.com/politics/nixon-forces-firing-of-coxrichardson-ruckelshaus-quit-president-abolishers-prosecutors-officefbi-seals-records/2012/06/04/gJQAFSR7IV_story.html (last visited
November 22, 2013).
53

54

118

1 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2013)

statute, the Ethics in Government Act, which we will address
in a moment.
The Supreme Court addressed this claimed
presidential removal power first in Frank Myers v. United
States.58 President Woodrow Wilson fired Frank Myers, a
postmaster in Oregon despite the fact that he had a statutory
four-year term, and his firing required Senate advice and
consent. The Supreme Court in Myers decided that the
President can fire any executive branch employee who
performs only executive functions. That was the high point of
the unitary executive theory. In Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.,59
President Franklin D. Roosevelt fired the Senate-confirmed
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, William E.
Humphrey -- not for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office, as the act required, but because a rather
business-oriented Mr. Humphrey would not go along with his
views on the New Deal.60 The Supreme Court declared this
firing unconstitutional. Independent agencies with quasilegislative and/or quasi-judicial functions can be created by
Congress; and Congress can limit the Presidential removal
power of officers performing these functions to cause.
The last pertinent case is Morrison v. Olson.61 Ted Olson
was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of
Legal Counsel who tangled with some House committees who
investigated Superfund environmental clean-up law
enforcement efforts and alleged his having committed

criminal offenses in the process. He was investigated by
Alexia Morrison, a so-called independent counsel, the
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
296 U.S. 602 (1935).
60 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 283-84. The Court affirmed
Humphrey’s Executor in the 1958 decision of Wiener v. United States,
357 U.S. 349, which involved the removal of a member of the War
Claims Commission – a body with judicial functions – even though
the Congress had not specified the legitimate grounds for removal.
61 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
58
59
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functional equivalent of a special prosecutor appointed by a
special division of the courts and subject only to removal for
cause. This unique form of appointment and removal was
established through the Ethics in Government Act62 enacted in
the wake of Watergate. Mr. Olson challenged the
constitutionality of the independent counsel, stating that her
appointment by the courts violated the principle of the
separation of powers: instead of the courts, the President
should have appointed her. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
2 to 1, ruled for Olson.63 Judge Silverman confirmed the
unitary executive branch idea. His position was that the power
to appoint and remove persons from office must come from
the same branch.64 You cannot have some other branch come
in and appoint a person with such core executive functions as
a prosecutor has. The Supreme Court reversed in a 7 to 1
decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the Court that the
federal courts can appoint inferior officers, as they qualified
the independent counsel to be, and the Attorney General can
still remove him, but only for good cause.65 So removal
restrictions were extended even to officers that do not perform
legislative or judicial functions, but also core executive
functions such as investigation and prosecution. The only limit
is for Congress to tie the hands of the President regarding
removal if it impedes the President’s ability to perform his
constitutional duty.66 That is a very broad standard.
Thus, the pendulum swings back to Congress and the
take-care clause;67 meaning that Congress may construct an
office in a way that dictates the terms of appointment and
removal of officials holding such office. I would, however,
think that there could, and should, be a more limiting
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1978).
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
64 Id. at 481-82.
65 Olson, 487 U.S. at 690.
66 Id. at 691.
67 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
62
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interpretation of this opinion, restricting it to its rather unique
facts. This was a situation in which the executive branch itself
could possibly only be credibly investigated by someone who
gets appointed from the outside and does not work under the
full authority and supervision of the Attorney General. So
there could and should be, for this particular conflict of
interest, the case of an exception to Myers. It would make
eminent sense to consider Myers to still be in force for all other
executive employees.

IV. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Executive privilege is another area of asserted
executive power which we do not find in the text of the
Constitution itself. The case of United States v. Nixon was
concerned with a subpoena of certain documents and tapes
which the President claimed were privileged.68 The President’s
counsel argued that the Constitution grants an absolute
privilege
of
confidentiality
for
all
presidential
communications. On the other hand, it was asserted that it is
the judicial department’s role to say what the law is. The
President claimed that communications between high
government officials and advisors need to be protected, and
that the executive branch needs to be kept independent,
within its own sphere. For these reasons, the President should
be immune from being subpoenaed in an ongoing criminal
prosecution. The Supreme Court shot that argument down,
holding that there is no absolute unqualified presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process.69 It is not enough
to state a broad and undifferentiated claim of a public interest
in the confidentiality of presidential communications. The
Court held what a President can claim as privileged are
concretely identified military, diplomatic, or sensitive national
68
69

See 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 706.
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security secrets.70 Furthermore, the Court stated that this type
of information will be checked in chambers to verify that a
claim of privilege is justified.71

V. WAR AND EMERGENCY POWERS
The last area of controversial exercises of power
concerns executive authority in the case of war or other
emergencies. At Lincoln Memorial University, it is appropriate
to talk about the Civil War. During the war, Lincoln blockaded
Southern ports after the secession of the states which formed
the Confederacy.72 The suits challenging the proclamation of
that blockade resulted in a decision by the United States
Supreme Court, the Prize Cases of 1863, where, not
surprisingly, Justice Grier for the Supreme Court stated that
the President is the pre-eminent war-maker in his role as
Commander-in-Chief, and that Congress has a very narrow
veto power.73 The only dissenter, Justice Nelson, saw Congress
as the primary war-maker, since they had the power to declare
war and to raise monies for the Armies and to fund it.74 All
the President had, in his view, was the power to repel sudden
attacks.75
The outcome of this case was a major victory for the
President. This theory, however, came under heavy attack
during the Vietnam War due to the high cost of error and
misperceptions in international relations. This set the scene for
great economic, physical, and emotional sacrifice for the
Id. at 713.
Id. at 711.
72 For a concise historical account of Lincoln’s blockade of the South,
see The Blockade of Confederate Ports, 1861-1865, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, http://www.history.state.gov/
milestones/1861-1865/ blockade (last visited November 22, 2013).
73 See 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
74 Id. at 668.
75 Id. at 691-92.
70
71
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nation. As a result, the Congress determined that there need to
be some deliberative process before the nation goes to war. To
that end, in 1973, the War Powers Resolution was enacted.76
Congress overruled a Presidential veto of this resolution, and
it became the War Powers Act which required an end to an
armed conflict if certain conditions were fulfilled.77 All
Presidents have rejected this resolution, and have not
complied with all of its required procedures. The Court has
not yet ruled on any attempts to clarify the reach of Congress’
war powers.
In 1936, however, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Co. provided the Executive Branch with
another strong victory in the field of foreign affairs.78 This
case concerned the sale of arms to Bolivia in violation of a
Presidential proclamation that prohibited this transaction.79
Justice Sutherland said that the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation in the
international arena. He alone negotiates treaties; the Congress
and the Senate cannot invade that territory. The President is
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations also in order to avoid embarrassment
internationally. Congress’ legislation must often accord the
President broad discretion, one not admissible when dealing
with domestic affairs. The President has more information, he
The War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973).
For an overview of the historical background and detailed
requirements of the War Powers Resolution, see War Powers, THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/warpowers.php (last visited November 22, 2013).
78 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
79 For the actual copy of the U.S. Senate report adopting a House
Joint Resolution granting the President the power to impose an arms
embargo against nations participating in the Chaco War, see
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/pqpresult
page.gispdfhitspanel.pdflink/http%3A$2f$2fprod.cosmos.dc4.bowk
er-dmz.com$2fapp-bin$2fgisserialset$2f5$2f4$2f2$2fa$2f9770_
srp1153_from_1_to_2.pdf/entitlementkeys=1234%7Cappgis%7Cserialset%7C9770_s.rp.1153 (last visited November 22, 2013).
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communicates secretly with other leaders and there is a
longstanding tradition of broad delegation. What now about
the constitutional text?
There are many foreign affairs powers allocated to
Congress in the Constitution. For example, Congress may
declare wars, raise armies, militias and navies, regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and so on.80 Still, the President
is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the President
negotiates treaties, even though he or she needs them to be
approved in the Senate by a two-thirds majority. In practice,
this Presidential power has been ever more cabined by
Congress by it becoming much more involved, particularly, in
congressional-executive agreements, and in the Senate
approval debate of treaties, where this body adds reservations,
interpretations, and declarations of understanding.81
The case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
decided in 1951, however, limits Presidential power in such
important ways that it will forever be in all constitutional law
textbooks.82 Youngstown involved a labor dispute in the steel
industry where a strike was imminent. A few hours before the
strike, President Truman issued Executive Order 10340,
directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession and
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: “Congress shall have the power…To declare
war…To raise and support Armies…To provide and maintain a
Navy.”
81 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-2: “The President shall be commander
in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States…[and] He shall
have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur…”. For details, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN, MAHNOUSH H.
ARSANJANI, SIEGFRIED WIESSNER & GAYL S. WESTERMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (2004), at 1286 et
seq. (re congressional-executive agreements), and 1320 et seq. (re
reservations). For an example, see the “declaration” in the Senate
Report on the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights that the rights under this covenant are “not self-executing.”
Id. at 1329.
82 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
80
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run most of the steel mills.83 The President argued this strike
would jeopardize national defense because of the on-going
Korean War. The Secretary issued possessory orders. On
April 30th the District Court enjoined the Secretary of
Commerce from continuing the seizure and possession of the
mills, and the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court’s
decision. Cert was granted immediately on May 3rd, argued
on May 12th, and the decision announced on June 2nd. The
Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The
plurality opinion was written by Justice Black, but he was
practically alone in stating that the President’s power can only
be derived from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself.84
The controlling law is difficult to discern. There is the
opinion by Justice Frankfurter who advocated some theory of
adverse possession of powers, which included a systematic,
un-broken practice known to Congress and never before
disapproved.85 Justice Jackson, another eminent jurist on the
Court, started with the axiom that, in order to have a workable
government, the two branches have to work together. If
Congress opposed some action of the President, the President
cannot do it. If it is at least to be implied, from the facts, that
Congress agrees with the President, he can go ahead with his
planned action. If there is silence, whichever branch acts first
can do so under the doctrine of concurrent authority.86 In this
case, Congress spoke first through the Taft-Hartley Act87 in
To view the complete text of President Truman’s Executive Order,
see The American Presidency Project, Executive Order 10340 –
Directing the Secretary of Commerce to Take Possession of and Operate the
Plants
and
Facilities
of
Certain
Steel
Companies,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78454
(last
visited
November 22, 2013).
84 343 U.S. at 585.
85 Id. at 610-11.
86 Id. at 635 et seq.
87 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1947).
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which it expressly rejected Presidential involvement in labor
strikes. Stated simply, Congress said the President should not
have the power to interfere in domestic labor disputes. An
often overlooked but interesting fact is that there were three
dissenters, led by Chief Justice Vinson, who said essentially
that the President can make law in the presence of a national
emergency.88 They were joined by two members of the
majority, Justice Clark and Justice Burton, who were not
disinclined to follow that line of reasoning, albeit in a much
more restricted way. They formed what constitutes, in my
view, the real holding of Youngstown. Justice Clark stated that
the President has broad authority in times of grave and
imperative national emergency.89 The situation at hand, in his
view, did not constitute such a compelling emergency at this
time. Justice Burton agreed with this, finding that Congress
had also specified procedures for this particular emergency,
i.e. the Taft-Hartley Act, which excluded the measure of
seizure. Therefore, despite Justices Jackson’s and Frankfurter’s
opinions, the rule of Youngstown is that the President possesses
special emergency powers in times of grave and imperative
national threat.
The Dames & Moore v. Regan decision in 1981 elevated
Justice Jackson’s tripartite test to the test of the majority.90 This
case interpreted an executive agreement that suspended
private claims against Iran in the wake of the Mullahs’
takeover of Iran where American interests were harmed. This
case arose from a deal negotiated by President Carter in
Algiers the day before President Reagan took office. Under
this agreement, the private claims that were pending in U.S.
courts were to be suspended and then directed to arbitration
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667 et seq.
Id. at 662 (“In my view, the Constitution does grant to the
President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative
national emergency. In fact, to my thinking, such a grant may well be
necessary to the very existence of the Constitution itself.”).
90 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

88

89

126

1 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2013)

in a newly-constituted Iran-U.S. claims tribunal. Many such
claims are still pending. This suspension of claims and their
subsequent arbitration was not one of the actions foreseen in
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act91 which
Congress had enacted in 1977. The Executive Branch could
nullify private claims, but it could not suspend them.
However, Congress’ silence on the issue was looked upon by
the Court as favoring Presidential power, and Congress did
not really object to that kind of solution. The Court also
referred to Justice Frankfurter’s idea that international
settlements have been entered into in a systematic, unbroken
way never before challenged by Congress and thus allowed
this agreement to stand.
Taken together, these decisions may confirm a
presidential emergency power, but not an extra-constitutional
one. This is not like Germany during the Weimar Republic in
1933 where President Hindenburg’s emergency powers
allowed him to abrogate democratic freedoms and pave the
way for Hitler to become the sole, pernicious leader of the
nation.92 It is also not the type of powers found under the 1853
Argentinian Constitution, which allowed many military
dictatorships to live freely under the Constitution because
they came into power under the pretext of responding to an
emergency situation.93 That kind of extra-constitutional
emergency power has been effectively rejected in the United
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (1977).
See generally Neil MacCormick, Jurisprudence, Democracy, and the
Death of the Weimar Republic, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1095 (1999). The
operative provision was Article 48 of the Constitution of the Weimar
Republic.
93 Carlos Rosenkrantz, Constitutional Emergencies in Argentina: The
Romans (not the Judges) Have the Solution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1557, 1558
(2011) (“The 1853 constitution allowed congress, in case of internal
commotion, and the senate, in case of foreign attack, to declare a
state of siege and to suspend individual rights provided that the
constitution or authorities created thereby were in danger. From
1854 until 2001, the state of siege was declared fifty-seven times.”).
91
92
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States. Justice Jackson, in Youngstown, noted that “emergency
powers tend to kindle emergencies.”94 The thought being, once
one has that power written in the Constitution the powers that
be tend to take advantage of it. The U.S. Constitution does not
expressly confer such powers. There was no discussion
regarding such powers in the Constitutional Convention
either. This does not, however, exclude the fact that the need
for such emergency powers exists. In fact, a Senate special
committee established in 1972 found that, by then, Congress
had enacted 470 statutes that grant the President emergency
powers.95 I already mentioned the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, but there is also the National
Emergency Act of 1976.96 They can be broadly interpreted, as
we have seen in Dames & Moore, but the question is: can they
be interpreted against the will of Congress? Probably not. In
any event, they are only to be exercised in the face of grave
and imperative national emergencies.
There have been arguments that, especially in war
time, there is no law, inter arma silent leges.97 This is no longer
true, since we have the Lieber Code in the U.S.98 and the 1949
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols
internationally. They define what is allowable in times of war.
The U.N. Charter and international practice also define when
war can be started.99 There is an international crime of
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650.
CRS Report for Congress, National Emergency Powers, Harold C.
Relyea Specialist in American National Government, Government
Division, December 10, 1990, revised April 29, 1991, at http://usathe-republic.com/emergency%20powers/crs.html# /48.
96 National Emergency Act of 1976, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1976).
97 “In times of war, the law falls silent.” For detailed discussion, see
ROZA PATI, DUE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. AN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS 14 et seq. (2009).
98 See Jordan J. Paust, Dr. Francis Lieber and the Lieber Code, 95 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 112 (2001).
99 U.N. Charter art. 39-51 (self-defense and authorization by the UN
Security Council). There is also the apparent approval, under
customary international law, of humanitarian intervention in cases
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aggression that was just also defined for the International
Criminal Court,100 and our Supreme Court did in fact use
Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions when it
decided the Hamdan case.101 Only a month later, the Military
Commissions Act turned this around by declaring that all the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions are non-self-executing,
and as a result cannot be used in U.S. courts.102 Beyond the
concept of emergency powers, we have executive orders, and
presidential directives. These have the full force of law, but
they need to rest within the original powers of the President or
within the confines of legislation set by Congress.103

VI. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION
When we aim at determining the limits of executive
powers, or any other legal issue within the structure of the
Constitution, we ought to look at the problem from the
perspective of the political opponent as well. That is, how
would he or she use whatever power we ascribe to him or her?
In particular, how could these powers be abused by a
President of the other political persuasion? Second, the
structure of decision-making should be seen in the context of
achieving a public order of human dignity, for the function of
of massive violation of fundamental human rights. Myres S.
McDougal & Siegfried Wiessner, Law and Minimum World Public
Order, in MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR xix, lii (1994).
100 The international crime of aggression was defined in Kampala,
Uganda on June 11, 2010. Coalition for the International Criminal
Court, The Crime of Aggression, at http://www.iccnow.org/
?mod=aggression (last visited November 24, 2013).
101 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the use of
military tribunals to try Guantánamo Bay detainees violated
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
102 The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-949
(2006).
103 John Contrubis, Executive Orders and Proclamations, CRS Report
for Congress # 95-722A, March 9, 1999, at 1-2.
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all law is to serve human beings and not the other way
around. We have to appraise the outcome, in terms of its
consequences on human beings, of whatever constitutional
structuring we have now and what we aim to have. Does it
maximize access by all to all the things humans desire,
humans want out of life? Does it pave the road for access to
the processes of shaping and sharing of all the things humans
strive to achieve in this great republic: power, wealth,
affection, rectitude, enlightenment, skills, well-being, and
respect?104
In the area of the vertical separation of powers,
commonly known as federalism, we see that its structure in
our nation has for quite some time allowed for the exclusion of
some people from the political process. But today, especially
since President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation,
we can say, with good reason, that federalism is an
“architecture for freedom”:105 its structuring allows decisionmaking on the lowest possible level – close to maximum
quality access to power for all. Combined with the principle
of subsidiarity, it empowers individuals. The question then is:
is this also true for the principle of the horizontal separation of
powers, i.e. the personal walls dividing the various branches
of government? A similar yardstick should be applied here: do
the legal consequences drawn from it fulfill the needs and
104

Professor Myres McDougal has provided a most useful
methodology to analyze a problem in this context and to resolve it. It
is outlined, in great detail, in his lecture The Application of Constitutive
Prescriptions: An Addendum to Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 135
(1979). His approach to law in general is problem- and policyoriented, and was developed in close collaboration with policy
scientist Harold D. Lasswell. Cf. Lasswell & McDougal’s two-volume
treatise, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE
FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992). See
also W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The
New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 575-582
(2007).
105

Wiessner, Federalism, supra note 5.
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meet the aspirations of humans which the Constitution and all
laws under it are supposed to serve? The powers of the
President in this context do have to face the same scrutiny as
any other decision making body under our venerable
Constitution.
Does our constitutional system properly balance the
interests of security and liberty? As a lawyer, you will be party
to important decisions – in the courtroom, in legislatures, as
advisor to, or even member of, the government. You should,
as a law student, see yourself as one of the future leaders of
the nation, as trustee of the community. You know that the
law of yesterday is not necessarily the law of tomorrow. I
recommend that you take a close look at yesterday’s laws,
responses to the social problem they try to cure, and attempt
to improve them in the interest of all. While teaching practical
legal skills is important, legal education has a broader calling.
As public servant, you ought to try to understand and shape
the law106 -- convince others that different arrangements might
better achieve the goals of the flourishing of all. As to the
President, we would not want to see him as a philosopherking, but it helps for him or her to have a good philosophy.

Siegfried Wiessner, The New Haven School of Jurisprudence: A
Universal Toolkit for Understanding and Shaping the Law, 18 ASIA
PACIFIC L. REV. 45-61 (2010).
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